Abstract: This paper documents the impact of U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises on equity indexes in sixteen countries, covering both developed and emerging economies. Using high-frequency intraday data, I find a large and significant response of Asian, European, and Latin American equity indexes to U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises at short time horizons. In this paper, I use two proxies for monetary policy surprises: a surprise change to the current target federal funds rate, and a revision to the path of future monetary policy (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) ). Consistent with results for the U.S. equity market, this paper finds that in most cases foreign equity indexes react only to a surprise change in the current target rate. On average, a hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the federal funds target rate is associated with a ½ to 2½ percent increase in foreign equity indexes. The variation of the response across countries appears to be more related to the degree of financial integration with the United States than it is to trade linkages with the United States or the degree of exchange rate flexibility.
Introduction
Extensive studies have documented a significant relationship between U.S. monetary policy and U.S. equity prices, but only a few studies have examined the relationship between U.S. monetary policy and foreign equity prices (e.g., Bailey (1990) and Conover, Jensen, and Johnson (1999) ).
1 Bailey (1990) finds weak evidence of foreign equity market responses to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement surprises. This finding is surprising because the U.S. economy plays such an important role in the global economy. News regarding changes in U.S. monetary policy, which affect U.S. economic activity, should significantly influence foreign economic fundamentals and thus foreign equity market returns.
The weakness of the existing evidence may owe to the use of low-frequency data and to the proxies used to capture monetary policy surprises. Previous studies that use low-frequency data to examine the response of foreign equity prices to FOMC announcement surprises may fail to detect responses that are incorporated very quickly. Recent research, focusing mainly on developed economies, has shown that the response of financial markets to news, mostly macroeconomic announcements, occurs very rapidly (e.g., Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1999) , and Andersen, Bollerslev, Dieblod, and Vega (2003) ).
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Existing studies have frequently used survey-based measures, often obtained from Money Market Services, of expectations of the future federal funds target rate. Federal funds futures, however, may provide a better measure of market expectations. Indeed, Krueger and Kuttner (1996) show that fed funds futures yield efficient forecasts of the future fed funds rate. In addition, most previous studies have used only a single proxy for monetary policy surprises. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) provide evidence that monetary policy surprises contain more than just a surprise in the announced target rate. They show that two factors are needed to capture monetary policy surprises, one for the current target rate and another for the path of future monetary policy.
This paper is the first to study the response of global equity indexes to FOMC announcement surprises using high-frequency intraday data and two proxies for U.S. monetary policy surprises. The target surprise is defined as the difference between the announced target fed funds rate and expectations derived from fed funds futures contracts. The path surprise is defined as the component of the change in one-year-ahead eurodollar interest rate futures that is uncorrelated with the target surprise. The path surprise is intended to proxy for news that market participants have learned from the FOMC's statement about the expected future path of monetary policy over and above what they have learned about the level of the target rate.
In contrast with previous studies that focus only on a single country or a few countries, I
study the reaction to FOMC announcement surprises of equity markets in sixteen countries, covering both developed and emerging economies, making the empirical results more general.
The sample consists of 53 FOMC announcements between September 1998 and November 2004.
I focus on equity market responses because equities are the only asset class that is highly liquid across both developed and emerging economies. I examine the reaction of Latin American equity indexes in a one-hour window around the FOMC announcement. Because Asian and European markets are closed at the time of FOMC announcements (roughly 14:15 Eastern Time), I
examine the overnight return reactions of Asian and European equity markets. I control for other important news unrelated to FOMC announcements that may occur during an overnight return window by using the net of FOMC effect return on the S&P 500 index futures. The net of FOMC effect return is computed as the (logarithmic) change in S&P 500 index futures between the equity market close of each country prior to the FOMC announcement and the following morning's open, excluding the component of the change that occurs in a one-hour window around the FOMC announcement.
I find that foreign equity markets do respond to FOMC announcements, and that they respond mainly to the target surprise. Furthermore, equity markets in both developed and emerging economies incorporate news about U.S. monetary policy surprises very quickly. The rapid incorporation of news effects is consistent with empirical evidence documented in various developed-economy financial markets, and it helps explain why previous studies based on lowfrequency data fail to find significant effects. I find that the size of the equity market response varies greatly across countries, ranging from the smallest response in Malaysia and the largest responses in Hong Kong and Korea (even larger than that in the United States). For example, a hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the fed funds target rate is associated with about ½ percent increase in the Malaysian equity index, 1¾ percent increase in the U.S. equity index, and 2½ percent increases in Hong Kong and Korean equity indexes. 3 The paper also finds that the cross-sectional variation of the response is more related to proxies for financial integration with the United States than it is to proxies for real economic integration or exchange rate flexibility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources.
Empirical models and results are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 examines factors that affect cross-country variation in the response to FOMC announcement surprises. Section 5 presents a conclusion and a discussion of the implications of my finding.
Data Description
The sample period includes all FOMC announcements from September 29, 1998 through Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) provide evidence that monetary policy surprises contain more than just a surprise to the announced target rate. They show that two factors are needed to capture monetary policy surprises. The target surprise is defined as the difference between the announced target fed funds rate and expectations derived from the current-month federal funds futures contract (Kuttner (2001)), and it is computed as the change in the currentmonth federal funds futures contract rate in a thirty-minute window around the FOMC announcement (ten minutes before and twenty minutes after), adjusting for the day of the meeting within a calendar month specified in the current-month contract (Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2002) and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) ). 4 Fed funds futures contracts have a payout that is based on the average effective fed funds rate that prevails over the calendar month specified in the contract. Therefore, we need to adjust for the day of the month when we derive expectations of the fed funds rate. For FOMC meetings that occur in the last seven days of the month, the target surprise is computed as the unadjusted change in the next-month fed funds futures contract (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) ). Results are qualitatively similar when I compute the target surprise using a one-hour window around the announcement (fifteen minutes before and forty-five minutes after).
Measure of Monetary Policy Surprises
The path surprise is defined as the component of the change in one-year-ahead eurodollar interest rate futures in a thirty-minute window around the announcement that is uncorrelated with the target surprise. To derive the path surprise, I run a regression of the change in one-yearahead eurodollar interest rate futures on a constant and the target surprise. The innovation from the regression is the path surprise. Coefficient estimates for this regression are shown in the note of (2002)), making them unsuitable for a very short-run analysis.
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Weekly data for all sixteen equity markets are used to estimate the general comovement with the U.S. equity market. The sample is from January 1990 through November 2004.
Proxies for Real and Financial Integration and Exchange Rate Flexibility
I use the ratio of each country's international trade (exports plus imports) with the United
States to its GDP and the ratio of each country's exports to the United States to its GDP to proxy I use three proxies to measure the degree of financial integration. First, I use the ratio of foreign equity holdings to each country's equity market capitalization (foreign participation ratio). Data on the equity holdings of foreign investors are from the IMF's Portfolio Investment:
announcement days (about 1,500 observations for each country). Estimates on the overnight return in the S&P 500 index futures are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for all countries. R-squared statistics are 0.5 for France, United Kingdom, and Hong Kong, 0.4 for Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, 0.3 for Korea, 0.2 for Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand, and 0.1 for Indonesia. These results are evident that the return in the S&P 500 index futures can capture movements in Asian and European overnight returns well. Finally, I also use the coefficient from a regression of each country's (logarithmic) equity price changes on U.S. (logarithmic) equity price changes at weekly frequencies over the same sample period used in this study. This regression coefficient is intended to capture the generalized comovement of each country's equity market with the U.S. equity market.
To measure exchange rate flexibility, I use two proxies. First, I use a dummy variable derived from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
The dummy variable equals one for a fixed or currency board regime, two for a limitedflexibility regime, three for a managed float regime, and four for a fully floating regime. Second, I use Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 's measure of exchange rate regime. The IMF exchange rate classification, used in the first proxy, is based on official government announcements. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) note that actual exchange rate regimes often differ from officially announced regimes. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) attempt to overcome this problem by using market-determined parallel exchange rates to help classify each country's actual exchange rate regime.
Do Foreign Equity Indexes Respond to FOMC Announcement Surprises?

Theory and Empirical Specification
U.S. monetary policy can affect foreign equity prices through several channels, some of which are similar to the channels through which U.S. monetary policy affects U.S. equity prices.
First, a surprise increase in the fed funds rate can raise the discount rate that is applied to the expected future dividend stream, thereby tending to lower U.S. equity prices. To the extent that the fed funds rate path affects global interest rates, one might expect a higher fed funds rate would tend to raise the rate of discount in foreign countries and thus lower foreign equity prices.
Second, an unanticipated movement in the fed funds rate may also convey information about future economic activity in the United States, which in turn may affect firms' expected cash flows; however, the direction of this relationship may differ across episodes. In some instances, a higher fed funds rate may lead the market to downgrade its forecast of future economic activity, reflecting the contractionary effect of tighter monetary policy. In other instances, a higher fed funds rate may be taken as a sign of greater optimism about the strength of the U.S. economy. To the extent that U.S. economic activity influences global activity, these channels may be at work in foreign equity markets as well.
Third, a surprise in the fed funds rate can influence foreign exchange rates. The exchange rate can influence equity prices through either the discount rate component or the expected future cash flows component or both, making the net effect unclear. The strength of each component depends on the ability of the exchange rate to adjust flexibly to changes in global interest rates. For example, assume that uncovered interest rate parity holds and that the exchange rate adjusts fully to changes in global interest rates. In this case, an unanticipated increase in U.S. interest rates, which leads to an increase in global interest rates, will lead the dollar to appreciate against other foreign currencies and should boost foreign exports to the United States. This, in turn, may lead to increases in foreign equity prices. In contrast, suppose uncovered interest rate parity holds but the exchange rate does not adjust to changes in global interest rates. Then, a surprise increase in U.S. interest rates should lead to higher foreign interest rates which will lead to lower foreign equity prices. These are two extreme cases. Most countries' exchange rate adjustment lies somewhere between these two extremes.
Finally, a surprise change in U.S. interest rates may affect foreign equity prices through portfolio adjustments in multiple markets which are linked through institutions such as global mutual funds, hedge funds, and brokerage firms (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002)).
The empirical methodology follows the standard event study literature. I examine equity returns in a narrow window around the FOMC announcement. For Latin American and U.S. equity markets, I use a one-hour window that begins fifteen minutes before and ends forty-five minutes after the FOMC announcement. For Asian and European equity markets, I use an overnight window that begins at the market's close before the FOMC announcement and ends one half-hour after the official opening time the next day. 11 Specifically, I estimate the following regression separately for each country:
where R i,t is the return of country i stock market index on day t, TS is the target surprise, PS is the path surprise, S&P Net is the net of FOMC effect return on the S&P 500 index futures, and e is an error term. Since we can measure an immediate response in Western Hemisphere equity markets, I do not include the net of FOMC effect term in the regressions for these countries.
The regression for each country is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The estimates are based only on those observations when announcements were made. Because the path surprise is an innovation from a regression of the one-year-ahead eurodollar interest rate futures on a constant and the target surprise, I need to account for the generated regressor problem when computing the standard errors in equation (1). To account for that, I compute coefficient estimates' standard errors from a sampling-with-replacement bootstrap with 1,000
repetitions. 
Preliminary Analysis
To investigate whether foreign equity indexes respond to FOMC announcements, I
compare return volatility on days with and without FOMC announcements. Panel A of Figure 3 plots return volatility for equity markets in Latin America and the United States computed over an hour around the FOMC announcements. It is evident that volatilities on FOMC days are much higher than on non-FOMC days. The Chi-squared test statistics for all countries indicate a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of equal volatility on FOMC and non-FOMC days.
Panel B of Figure 3 plots overnight return volatility for equity markets in Asia and Europe. It is evident that, in general, volatilities are higher on FOMC days than on non-FOMC days, and the differences are again statistically significant. In addition, volatilities for emerging-economy equity indexes are higher than those of developed-economy equity indexes, consistent with previous studies based on lower frequency data. (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (1997) ). Overall, the evidence on return volatility suggests that foreign equity markets do react to FOMC announcements. The next subsection explores the direction of the response to announcement surprises. surprises. This finding may reflect the different economic growth path of Japan during the sample period and the relative isolation of Japanese financial markets. Estimates of the average comovement between each country's overnight return and the net of FOMC effect return on the S&P 500 index futures are shown in the fourth column for the full sample. It is evident that the net of FOMC effect return, which is designed to proxy important news that are unrelated to FOMC surprises, is highly correlated with overnight returns. The significance of these estimates underscores the importance of including a control for non-FOMC news.
Empirical Results
As pointed out by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) , some observations of the FOMC announcement may have unusually large influences on the estimated response. Thus, I reestimate equation (1) using only scheduled announcements. I excluded all three intermeeting moves, which were also identified in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) as having a large influence on the estimates. The parameter estimates are shown in columns six through eight. The estimated responses are still significantly negative for most countries, but are smaller in magnitude for countries in Asia and become insignificant for a few countries. Excluding the three intermeeting moves from the sample also decreases the adjusted R-squared substantially. I test for the statistical significance of the difference in the response to scheduled and unscheduled announcements, by interacting a dummy variable for intermeeting moves with the target surprise.
I cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 95 percent confidence level that the coefficient on this interaction term equals zero for all countries; thus one cannot reject the null of no statistical difference in the equity market response to scheduled versus unscheduled announcements.
14 To test whether the reaction to FOMC announcement surprises is fully incorporated in overnight returns, I also estimate equation (1) 
Explaining the Cross-Country Variations in the Response
Results in the previous section naturally prompt the question why does the response of equity prices to FOMC announcement surprises differ across countries? Before exploring the 14 I also test for the asymmetry in the response to the direction of the surprise and the direction of policy action. There is only weak evidence for these two types of asymmetry, similar to results documented in the U.S. equity market (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) ).
cross-country response differences, I test whether the country responses are statistically different from one another. Following Bailey (1990) , I test for the difference in the response for one pair of countries at a time. I combine observations from two countries and estimate the following equation:
where country i is the base country, country j is the comparison country, and D j equals one for observations of country j and zero otherwise. I drop the path surprise term because it is not significant in most cases, as shown in Table 2 . There are many factors that can influence the size of each country's response to FOMC announcement surprises. First, the degree of real economic integration with the United States may determine the importance of the U.S. economy to its domestic economy and thus to domestic equity prices. Second, a country that is more integrated into international financial markets should respond more to changes in foreign asset prices. To the extent that U.S.
monetary policy influences global interest rates, we would expect a country that is more integrated to respond more. Lastly, the ability of the exchange rate to adjust flexibly to external shocks may influence the size of the equity response. A country that has only limited exchange rate flexibility will have to adjust its domestic interest rate more than a country with more exchange rate flexibility (Frankel, Schmukler, and Serven (2004) and Shambaugh (2004)). 15 To the extent that movements in equity market indexes are driven mainly by the discount rate component (see Campbell (1990) for evidence in the United States and Ammer and Mei (1998) for evidence in international markets), we would expect countries with less flexible exchange rates to respond more to U.S. monetary policy surprises. and estimates of beta from a regression of the foreign equity return (in local currency) on the S&P 500 index return. These betas are estimated from weekly data during my sample period.
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Proxies for the flexibility of exchange rate regime are dummy variables derived from the IMF's 15 For example, under the Hong Kong's currency board exchange rate arrangement, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority adjusts its domestic target interest rate one-for-one with the U.S. fed funds rate. 16 Results are qualitatively similar when I compute the relative size of exports and trade with the U.S. as a percentage of country's total trade. 17 Results are qualitatively similar when I use U.S. investor participation in the domestic equity market (percentage of U.S. holdings in the domestic markets). 18 Results are qualitatively similar when I estimate the beta with weekly or monthly data from 1990. Table 5 . It is evident that the two proxies for real integration and the two proxies for the exchange rate regime are highly correlated with each other, while the three proxies for financial integration are somewhat less, but still moderately correlated with each other. Comparing pairwise correlations of the size of the response to each proxy, it is evident that countries with more real and financial links to the United States respond more to FOMC announcements (more negatively correlated). Also, as expected if the discount rate component is important, countries with less flexible exchange rate regimes respond more to FOMC announcements (more positively correlated).
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restriction
To conserve space, I show the cross-sectional regression results for selected variables in Table 6 . I regress the estimates of the response to the target surprise (b1 from equation (1)) on proxies for real and financial integration and for exchange rate flexibility. It is evident that the cross-sectional variation in the response is more correlated with the proxy for financial integration than with the proxies for real economic integration or exchange rate flexibility.
However, because the adjusted R-squared statistics range from 0.05 to 0.07, the explanatory power of these proxies to explain the cross-sectional response variation is very low, suggesting that factors other than proxies examined in this paper must explain the difference in responses.
Conclusion
Using high-frequency intraday data, I document economically and statistically significant evidence of an impact of FOMC announcement surprises on global equity indexes. This is direct evidence that U.S. monetary policy affects foreign economies through equity markets. In addition, it is evident that news about U.S. monetary policy is important to global equity markets. The fact that global equity markets incorporate news rapidly likely explains why previous studies based on lower frequency data have generally been unable to document such strong linkages.
In this paper, I use two proxies for monetary policy surprises: a surprise change to the current target federal funds rate, and a revision to the path of future monetary policy (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004) ). Consistent with results for the U.S. equity market, this paper finds that in most cases foreign equity indexes react significantly only to surprises in the current target rate. The size of the response varies greatly across countries, and it is more related to proxies for financial integration than it is to proxies for real economic integration or exchange rate flexibility. Changes in one-year ahead eurodollar interest rate futures = -0.01 + 0.51*Target Surprise, R-sq = 0.28. where R is the country index return, TS is the target surprise, PS is the path surprise, and S&P Net is the net of FOMC effect return on the S&P 500 index futures. The sample period includes all FOMC announcements from September 29, 1998 through November 11, 2004 , excluding the September 17, 2001 Standard errors are in parentheses and are computed from a sampling-with-replacement bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions. Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold, and coefficients significant at the 10% level are underlined This table shows the t-statistic test on the coefficient of the comparison country (c1). Listed in each row is the base country, and a country on each column is the comparison country. The regression of equity index returns on target surprise and dummy variables for the comparison country (equation (2)) is as follows:
The sample period includes all FOMC announcements from September 29, 1998 through November 11, 2004, excluding the September 17, 2001 FOMC announcement. The t-statistic is computed using White's robust standard errors. t-statistics that are significant at the 5% level are bold, and those significant at the 10% level are underlined. This table shows means of proxies for real and financial integration and the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. The second column shows the estimates of the response to the target surprise (b1 from equation (1)). The third and fourth columns show, respectively, the ratio of exports to the U.S. to each country's GDP and the ratio of trade (exports plus imports) with the U.S. to each country's GDP. The fifth, sixth, and seventh columns show, respectively, the ratio of foreign holdings of domestic equities to each country's equity market capitalization, Miniane (2004) 's measure of capital control (the larger the value, the more capital control), and beta estimates from a regression of foreign return in local currency on U.S. S&P 500 index return (based on weekly data from September 1998 through Novermber 2004). The eighth and ninth columns show the measures of the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. The measure based on the IMF dummy variable (1 = peg or currency board; 2 = limited flexibility; 3 = managed float; 4 = free float) is shown in column eight, and the measure based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is shown in column nine (the larger the value, the more flexible the exchange rate regime).
All This table shows a correlation matrix of the size of the response to the target surprise (b1) to proxies for real and financial integration and the flexibility of the exchange rate regime. Proxies for real integration are the ratio of exports to the U.S. to each country's GDP and the ratio of trade (exports plus imports) with the U.S. to each country's GDP. Proxies for financial integration are the ratio of foreign equity holdings to each country's equity market capitalization, Miniane (2004) 's measure of capital control (the larger the value, the more capital control), and beta estimates from a regression of foreign equity return in local currency on U.S. S&P 500 index return (based on weekly data from September 1998 through November 2004). Proxies for the flexibility of the exchange rate regime are the IMF dummy variable (1 = peg or currency board; 2 = limited flexibility; 3 = managed float; 4 = free float) and a measure from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (the larger the value, the more flexible the exchange rate regime). 
